The case against attacking Syria

By Ask Foldspang Neve

At the moment of this writing, American, British and French warships have already been deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean in large numbers. So have a record number of Russian vessels, monitoring the situation and giving the Russian leadership the widest range of options to act.

Last Monday, when US Secretary of State John Kerry gave his casus belli speech, which was later reinforced by the vice-president, and then the President himself, it was apparently preceded by the activation of his diplomatic phone tree. Suddenly, the leaders of all of the most interventionist Western states suddenly put a strike on Syria on their respective agendas. While it is not noteworthy in itself that the European states that live under American military protection are also keen to follow the American lead, it was surprising how the rather heterogeneous group of leaders all made almost synchronic and similarly worded statements to their public audiences.

None of these leaders thought that there was much reason to deliberate the newly inspired policy. Most must have hoped that the grizzly televised images of hapless Syrians killed by chemical weapons were enough of an argument. However, Kerry’s speech obviously not only covered what everybody believes: that using chemical weapons is a crime and a moral offense. It also accused the Syrian leader Bashar Assad of ordering the act, stating that the troubled dictator had incriminated himself by not allowing the UN inspector team onto the site  of crime until four days had passed and important evidence of the crime allegedly had been destroyed  afterwards.

Nato attacks on Libya. Source: Human Rights Watch

There is no right way to kill the innocent. Scene from Libya after a NATO airstrike, 2011 (Source: Human Rights Watch).

Apart from the fact that such evidence cannot easily be destroyed and will last for years, this is all well and good. However, following the same logic, it is hard not to argue that it is equally incriminating that the American policy right now is to defy the stated UN wish to carry out the inspections to the end. In other words, it cannot be true that Assad is deemed guilty because he delays the access of the inspectors, and that we are then not willing to wait the few days it would take the same inspectors to carry out their investigation. If the military option is really based on punishing whoever is guilty of using chemical weapons, surely it must be important to know who that was? And surely, if such proof really existed in any shape apart from that prior to the attack on Iraq, it would have been presented to the public to galvanize us into demand for action?

As of the time of publication, we simply do not know who committed these crimes. Just declaring that the culprit is the leader we like the least, and who is an ally of a prime geopolitical challenger, does not count for evidence; on the contrary, coming to that conclusion should lead to suspicion of any such evidence. Interventionists must carry the burden of proof; the default cannot be that missiles are fired or troops are deployed.

Moreover, the British concern for consulting the Security Council is an obvious sham. Since the war in Syria has important proxy aspects to it,  the Russians would never allow a military intervention against the Syrian regime, much less so before actual evidence of Assad’s guilt has been presented. After what Russia’s policy establishment consider a blunder on Libya, this defensive stance is only further legitimized internally. The hasty British Security Council consultation, which would have been technically much more appropriate after the verdict of the UN experts team had been made public, was thus a diplomatic gambit aimed at securing two things: Showing to the British public that Brits care about international law; and at the same time, that the United Nations is a failing institution incapable of solving real problems due to averse Russian and Chinese reactions.

There are, at least, two lessons we could have learned from the war we started in Iraq. Firstly, that having good reasons to believe that a dictator stockpiles or uses chemical weapons is not a good enough reason to actually go to war. Intelligence reports might be wrong from the beginning, or they might be used in biased or even knowingly wrongful manners by the leaders receiving it. The latter, of course, was what neoconservative politicians and thinkers did as a prelude to invading Iraq. So far, no clear evidence of Assad’s guilt worthy of public scrutiny has been displayed to the public. That should be a bare minimum before war is declared.

For all we know at the moment, the atrocities could have been committed by a rogue general, by one of the many jihadist rebel groups who do not refrain from beheading Syrian Christians and using child soldiers, or by a faction of the increasingly embattled and desperate Syrian National Council trying to force the West to intervene on its behalf. What we do know is that Assad would have very little incentive to use the chemical weapons now that he looks like he could be winning the conflict by traditional means. Given that president Obama bound himself politically to respond if chemical weapons were in fact employed, it must have seemed pretty obvious to the politically savvy Syrian strongman that the Americans would feel a need to respond to any such action.

Secondly, there is very little that we can hope to achieve by military intervention, even assuming that we knew Assad to be the perpetrator. As the New Yorker’s George Packer appropriately put it, we all ‘want to pound the shit out of him’ (if not for the chemical attacks, then for his blatant disregard for human lives in general), but at the same time, ‘firing cruise missiles at Damascus’ prevents nothing about the tragedy going on in Syria. As we should have realized about dictators by now, they have a sword hanging over their heads. This is also why they cannot step down; their very rule is also the only guarantee of their continued safety, and that of their families. So as Packer puts it, Assad is ‘a bloody dictator fighting for survival. He’s going to do whatever he has to do.’

What we do know from interventions in both Iraq and Afghanistan is that military action short of permanent conquest and possible colonization (which can work if our desire is to create liberal institutions) is rather futile. Those, of course, would require us to compromise with our morals on an unprecedented scale, to mobilize a war effort much greater than those mobilized for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for us to stay in the subdued country indefinitely, none of which seem appealing to Western voters or leaders. With such concepts out of vogue, euphemisms abound. The ‘military intervention’ is a favorite. Changing the term we use for a phenomenon does not change the phenomenon underneath, however: a war is still a war, and all war is terrible.  Like in Libya, the scenario most similar to the present, the wrong people always get killed. Western missiles hitting Damascus, like those hitting Tripoli, will inevitably slay innocent Syrians, and if their deaths do not even have a realistic chance of changing the situation in Syria for the better or affecting the future calculations of cornered autocrats, then their blood will be on our hands.

Ask Foldspang Neve

Ask Foldspang Neve is currently pursuing his MA in political science at the University of Aarhus,  Denmark. He is writing on politics and religion from sociological and political science perspectives.

After the Snowden leaks: Why Europe needs a true federation

Even though the Economist was right when it recently called for Europeans not to throw the first stone in the diplomatic row over American spying on them, the argument behind this comment – that America still protects Europe, so Europeans should stay quiet – was wrong.

The problem with American spying is not just the use of clandestine methods; it’s the fact that European states on their own are too weak to do anything about it, and too unwilling to cooperate to change that fact. Instead of accepting their lot as tributaries, the inhabitants of the old world should start making American protection unnecessary.

There are different opinions on the benevolence of the American hegemon that has been part of giving Western Europe peace for the last 68 years. While some see it as a capitalist empire, no better than the British one whose dual role in world-policing and self-enrichment it overtook, others see the American umbrella as the only entity capable of saving Europe from itself and its Eastern neighbors. No matter the relative verisimilitudes of these claims, one thing is for sure: contrary to what Europeans continue to believe, the American government is not there to keep Europe and Europeans safe, and neither should it be.

Of course that would surprise only few Americans, but many Europeans seem to have grown so used to living in client kingdoms that they have de facto assumed American neighborliness to suggest that the American government is also theirs. The due attention that American elections get is a powerful symbol of this: it sometimes seems that Europeans forget that they are not eligible to vote in American elections.

Having long left their own great power status behind, even the intermediate European powers have been content with only weighing forcefully in against much poorer or outnumbered opponents. The principled stance that the French and British governments took when facing the Libyan crisis is hard to find when the matter is Russia intimidating its neighbors. Such bigger matters are safely left to the Americans to handle. If that means being subject to the unbounded desires of the American security apparatus, so be it.

The most docile European states are those that need a narrative of their intimacy with the United States as a plausible threat against the cooperation with their European neighbors. Northern European countries with the United Kingdom and Scandinavia in front have long played this game.

As of lately, Central and Eastern European countries with Poland in front have joined that camp as well. They are not swayed by Western European promises to keep them safe from Russian aggression, and they, too, see the benefit of making credible the threat of disengagement as a lever to get a better deal in the EU budget negotiations.

 Poland, of course, has especially bitter experiences with depositing her national security in the hands of others and has, at the same time, been especially keen to play the role of a major European Union player, on par with Spain and Italy or even with France and Germany (Poland fought a long battle over the Common Agricultural Policy as part of its accession agreement). All this is understandable given the short-term interests of European nation-states. It has little to do with serving European interests, however.

 After Edward Snowden made facts of assumptions on the American policy of intelligence gathering in Europe, however, Europeans should be reminded that America ultimately sees itself as alone in the world. That is probably why Charles de Gaulle’s old dictum that ‘France has no friends, only interests’ is often – ironically – attributed to Henry Kissinger speaking of the United States.

Nonetheless, it is true: with Germany apparently classified as an intelligence object in the same rank as China and Iran, Europeans should be reminded that there it bears a cost not to be able to protect one’s sovereignty. If this was not abundantly clear from the negotiations with an increasingly self-assured and hostile Russia, there should be no doubt left when a supposedly progressive American president is behind a program much more comprehensive than anything Putin would have been capable of on Brussels soil.

 This lack of a European entity that is able to stand up for its own interests is largely attributable to the internal politics of EU member states. While all inter-state bargaining is difficult, the last decade and a half of progress for the national-conservative movements of Europe has made it even more difficult. By now, all Northern European countries have far-right Eurosceptic parties that must be taken into consideration by the major parties of the political center when they express their stance on European matters.

Bizarrely enough, even though majorities of the European population support the real cornerstones of European cooperation, such as the free movement of labor, centrist politicians seem to keep believing that keeping your mouth shut until the topic goes away is the best way to counter criticism of the European project.

The American and European Union Flags - copyright:

The twin flags of the Western Alliance

For a long time, this might have been true, at least electorally speaking: criticism of the European Community came from both left and right, and no matter where centrists moved, it was like walking in a minefield. However, in the same period of time that criticism from the right has blossomed, much of the isolationism on the left has died out.

This is probably not least attributable to a change of strategy: instead of merely seeing the European project as a neoliberal plot to overthrow national welfare schemes, progressives started working through the European institutions to work for their own results on a grander scale than what could be achieved in member state parliaments. They have slowly started to realize that instead of promoting ever more protectionist policies doomed to ultimate failure (if capable of giving small amounts of instant gratification from voters), the European Union is a polity that as well as any other can be used to promote key agendas of the left.

Not so on the far right. As yet, the national-conservative movement still seems to feel that it has the momentum among voters and party members to simply increase its criticism of the supposedly antinational scheme that is the EU. In this way, mainstream conservative parties have taken over paroles once only heard on the political fringe; nowhere is this more obvious than in Britain, of course, where conservative backbenchers continuously threaten Prime Minister David Cameron with causing his downfall if he doesn’t ‘stand up to Brussels’.

Although these junior conservatives cannot threaten mainstream party members with primary election challenges – a favorite tactic of American Tea Partiers – their pressure has been enough to make Mr. Cameron lead Britain even further away from the Continent (which is, in practice, almost synonymous with ‘France’). However, mainstream conservatives everywhere from France to Sweden have started to appropriate some of the policy of the far right in an attempt to cover their flanks. In some cases minorities in the conservative parties now propose anti-federalism not only as a pragmatic measure to ward off the far right, but as a core project to supplant the many false starts that their parties have had lately (and who now remembers much of the Big Society?).

However, Northern-European national-conservatives still seem to be in such a state of euphoria over having found a cause for struggle which is not just anti-statist that they have left even the most obvious implicit questions about the potential outcomes of their policies unanswered. Primary among these is the question of what status European states have in the world.

As was also recently noted in the Economist, America’s share of the world economy might be shrinking, but Europe’s economy is shrinking in absolute terms. With it goes most of its already rather diminutive political clout. And with clout goes security and self-determination. Eastern European states have long been bullied by their old imperial master to the East. Estonia was the victim of the most comprehensive cyber-attack on a sovereign state in 2007. And before that, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder left many shocked when he took up the position as the chairman of Nord Stream AG, the consortium set up to build a pipeline leading gas directly from Russia to Germany, creating a feeling that the former German Chancellor might not keep his loyalties straight. Schröder’s was nominated to the position by the national Russian gas giant Gazprom, which he himself had insured against financial risk a few weeks earlier while still in office.

Hence, far from being a hypocritical outcry about the purported villainies of the United States, a strong reaction from the European populations to the American spying scheme would be a healthy one. But it should be directed where it hits home: at national parliaments. Much good would come out of the security crisis if it became part of the European population finally forcing their state parliaments to give up federal issues to Union politicians, who then would have to be elected in Union-wide elections. Contrary to what nationalist politicians repeat over and over, there is nothing that European institutions would like better than to be ruled by elected officials who would then have the mandate to wage Union-wide politics on appropriate matters. But they have to be given that mandate first, and only national governments and parliaments are able to give it to them.

An outcry over the spying scheme is appropriate, not because the American government is doing anything that is more despicable than what European states are doing themselves. (This dictum could be repeated with regards to foreign colonial wars as well, about which Europeans still forget that not only the United States knows how to defend its imperial interests.) But in European societies, such activities should at least be committed by somebody who can be held accountable to the European population. As fond as Europeans might be of him, Barack Obama is not.

This cannot become reality, however, as long as Europeans keep insisting on living in a continent of micro-kingdoms, which will ultimately be met with the same fact of life that the ancient Melians did, neighboring both Sparta and Athens: “That justice in human reasoning only gets considered in a relationship based on equality, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

Ask Foldspang Neve is currently pursuing his MA in political science at the University of Aarhus,  Denmark. He is writing on politics and religion from sociological and political science perspectives.Ask Foldspang Neve